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International Law?
Mark W. Janis*
INTRODUCTION
The recent developments in Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf
dramatize the efforts of the United States to muster the "support of
other states and international organizations in asserting principles of
international law and process. These diplomatic initiatives to win a
global consensus about the rule of law in international politics reflect
an important turn in U.S. policy. In the past few decades the United
States has mostly enunciated a parochial rhetoric regarding intekna-
tional law, treating it either as a sort of extension of United States
law or as a flexible framework that somehow always promoted U.S.
legal and political values. In the present, however, the United States
is promoting a vision of international law as a set of legal norms and
as a form of legal process that exists apart from a nationalistic inter-
pretation by the United States and is ultimately universal in nature.
The developments of the Gulf and in Eastern Europe have also
underscored as well the increasing importance of international insti-
tutions in the formulation and administration of international law. If
Security Council resolutions during the Gulf crisis helped shape spe-
cific diplomatic objectives and military tactics, they also fit into a
more general political context involving internationalism and non-
state actors. The internationalization of the media, for example, played
a role in the formulation of political initiatives in the Gulf, as it has
helped to encourage the political development of Eastern Europe.
Multinational enterprises helped prompt the Soviet Union into pur-
suing ties with the West. The Red Cross and other humanitarian
organizations are playing increasingly important roles in international
relief operations. Private environmental groups are ever-more influ-
ential in setting and implementing international environmental agen-
das. Such phenomena underscore the need to rearticulate the theory
and practice of international law. International lawyers have never
really made room for the obvious importance of non-state actors in
international politics. Although there have been many calls for such
recognition, international law needs finally to develop intellectual
models that include not only the state but also international institu-
tions and individuals.
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Now is the time to seize the opportunity afforded by the renewed
attention being paid to international law and modify the discipline's
contemporary conceptions, both in its basic theory and in its practice.
Now is the time to return to the universalism that characterized the
foundation of the modern law of nations. Now is the time to break
the mold of international law's twentieth-century paradigm, to assault
the discipline's basic assumptions, and to refashion the subject in a
form suitable for the obvious needs of the next century. This essay
begins the task by challenging the parochialism of the U.S. approach
to international law and by attacking some of the legal notions related
to the sovereign state. It concludes by doubting that the term "inter-
national law" is still appropriate for the discipline.
PAROCHIALISM
The initial problem, the paradigmatic parochialism of at least the
United States approach to the theory of international law, is encap-
sulated in the very title of the American Law Institute's Restatement of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.' The Restatement's first
section defines its subject and depicts its coverage:
1. Foreign Relations Law of the United States
The foreign relations law of the United States, as dealt with
in this Restatement, consists of
(a) international law as it applies to the United States; and
(b) domestic law that has substantial significance for the
foreign relations of the United States or has other substantial
international consequences .2
The Introduction to the Restatement, while confirming the first part of
the definition, that the "international law restated here derives largely
from customary international law and international agreements to
which the United States is a party"3 modifies this self-imposed limita-
tion with a more universalistic assertion drawn from the previous 1965
Restatement: "The positions or outlooks of particular states, including
the United States, should not be confused with what a consensus of
states would accept or support. '4 However, the second part of the
"Foreign Relations Law of the United States" is by definition "domes-
tic"; it is "federal law, deriving principally from the United States
1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD), THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
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Constitution, acts of Congress, and judicial decisions." 5 Furthermore,
the combination of this second domestic component with the "as it
applies to the United States" limitation of the first component gives
the Restatement a parochial orientation, all too clearly reflected in a
title, "Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,"
that mentions neither international law nor the law of nations. The
point seems to be, and it is arguably intended, that what is important
is not any universalistic law of nations but some particular law relating
to the foreign relations of the United States.
The Restatement's position is by no means the only possible U.S.
vision of international law. The forerunners of modern international
lawyers in the United States did not espouse a comparable parochial-
ism. Their intellectual models from the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, Grotius, Vattel, and Blackstone---each very influential on
the early American scene-were all decidedly universalistic. Grotius,
meaning to bridge the religious differences between the Catholic and
Protestant nations, chose to base his seminal text of 1625, On the Law
of War and Peace, on common sources drawn from Jewish theology,
Greek philosophy, and Roman law. 6 Vattel, in his much-read text first
published in 1758, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, relied less
than Grotius upon specific sources and more upon general principles,
which were, as his very title indicated, natural to all nations. 7 Vattel,
for example, defined the "necessary law of nations" as the law of nature
that all "nations are absolutely bound to observe.""
Universality is also to be found in the treatment of the law of
nations in Blackstone's foundational four-volume treatise (1765-1769)
on the laws of England:
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural
reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized
inhabitants of the world; in order to decide all disputes, to
regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and to insure the observance
of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which must fre-
quently occur between two or more independent states, and the
individuals belonging to each. 9
5. Id.
6. HuGo GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PAciS LIBRi TRES (Kelsey trans. 1925).
7. EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS (1797 ed.).
8. Id. at lviii.
9. 4 WILLIAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 66 (1st ed. 1765-
1769).
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The universalism of the classic texts of the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries was reflected in the two great nineteenth-century
American treatises addressing the law of nations. In his Commentaries
(1826-1830), Kent gave the law of nations first place, beginning his
four volumes with 200 pages on international law. 'o Kent modestly
saw the newly independent United States as "subject to that system
of rules which reason, morality, and custom had established among
the civilized nations of Europe, as their public law.""1 In 1836, in the
first English-language treatise devoted exclusively to international law,
Wheaton looked not only to Vattel's natural law but also to "the
general principles which may fairly be considered to have received the
assent of most civilized and Christian nations." 12
Admittedly, Kent and Wheaton shared notions linking and, to a
degree, limiting international law to "civilized" and Christian states.
Although I explore this linkage elsewhere,13 for our purposes here it
is sufficient to say that neither Kent nor Wheaton attempted to narrow
the compass of interesting and important international law to just the
view of or relevance to the United States. Rather, both Kent and
Wheaton stressed the importance of putting the international juris-
prudential approach of the United States well within the mainstream
of the common law of nations, albeit one more or less culturally linked
to the European tradition.
The parochialism of the Restatement is, sadly, essentially a twentieth-
century American phenomenon. Besides the Restatement itself, the only
longer twentieth-century American treatise on international law is
Charles Hyde's book, which appeared in 1922 and in a second edition
in 1945.14 Significantly, Hyde chose the title International Law, Chiefly
as Interpreted and Applied by the United States. The other major modern
extensive U.S. treatments of international law are the casebooks used
for law school and undergraduate teaching. Generally, they too rep-
licate the narrow focus of the Restatement.
Most straight-forward among the authors of the casebooks, Thomas
Franck and Michael Glennon carve out "foreign relations law" as a
distinct discipline. 15 Although their casebook covers much of the
10. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1-200 (2d ed. 1832).
11. Id. at 1.
12. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: WITH A SKETCH OF THE
HISTORY OF THE SCIENCE iii (1st ed. 1836).
13. Mark Janis, Religion and the Literature of International Law: Some Standard Texts, in THE
INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 61-84 (Janis ed.
1991); Janis, The International Law of Christendom: Kent, Wheaton and the Grotian Tradition, 39
NETH. INT'L L. REv. $rul (forthcoming 1992).
14. CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES (1st ed., 2 vols., 1922; 2d ed., 3 vols., 1945).
15. See generally THOMA S M. FRANCK & MICHAEL J. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND
NATIONAL SECURITY LAw (1987).
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material contained in other casebooks avowedly about international
law, Franck and Glennon write that they seek to teach about "the
interaction between the conduct of United States foreign relations and
the constitutional distribution of powers, prerogatives and rights
within the nation."'16 Franck and Glennon's casebook contrasts with
more typical international-legal casebooks, such as that by Sweeney,
Oliver, and Leech, 17 which, although devoted to international law,
contains large segments of material concerning United States domestic
law-for instance, large sections on United States rules about sovereign
immunity, the act of state doctrine, and jurisdictional conflicts.
Perhaps the best-known casebook, that by Henkin, Pugh, Schach-
ter, and Smit, devotes about one-third of its pages to United States
materials.' 8 Although American commentary, references, and notes
appear throughout the book, the largest United States elements relate
to international law in United States law, 19 bases of jurisdiction, 20
immunity from jurisdiction, 21 and bases of state responsibility. 22
Smaller United States elements, albeit some involving inter-state cases,
are spread throughout the book. 23
Of course, the Henkin casebook, like the others, does contain a
great amount of material that is not simply United States-oriented.
There are international court cases, International Law Commission
drafts, cases decided in foreign courts, foreign doctrine, United Na-
tions declarations and resolutions, treaties, and other international
agreements. Nevertheless, like the Restatennnt, the casebook is marked
by a strong emphasis on U.S. materials and perspectives.
THE SOVEREIGN STATE
However relative, the problem of the parochial emphasis of United
States foreign relations law exemplified by the Henkin casebook is
joined in more absolute terms by a second general problem of the
modern discipline of international law and one not confined to U.S.
practitioners and theorists: state-centricity. In their introduction, Hen-
kin et al. enunciate the. ordinary claim of international law that
16. Id. at xvii.
17. JoSEPH M. SWEE 1EY, COVEY T. OLIVER & NoYEs E. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM 323-514 (3d ed. 1988).
18. Louis HENKIN, RICHARD C. PUGH, OSCAR SCHACTER & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1987).
19. Id. at 144-227.
20. Id. at 820-90.
21. Id. at 891-979.
22. Id. at 1082-1147.
23. Id. at 40-45, 132-35, 255-66, 287-93, 382-85, 430-31, 440-45, 542-47, 598-
600, 608-10, 618-49, 662-64, 708-36, 763-67, 788-91, 1042-47, 1065-67, 1079-81,
1151-62, 1284-89, 1292-93, 1299-1301, 1306, 1312-14, 1376-78.
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"[ijnternational law is the law of the international community of states.
.. [lInternational law is law made by states to govern relations among
them ....- 24 While the intellectual and jurisprudential formulations
of this state-centric aspect of positivistic doctrine can be criticized, 25
here I merely sketch out a few present-day challenges, practical and
theoretical, to the legal notion of the sovereign state as the central
actor in international law.
Such challenges are of critical importance. No matter how dramatic
might be the changes in world order effected by other phenomena,
including the end of the Cold War and the war in the Gulf, nothing
catalyzes the transformation of international law more substantially
than the decline of the sovereign state. As the world's transactions-
be they economic, environmental, cultural, military, political or so-
cial-increasingly transcend national boundaries, so the utility of the
concept of the sovereign state diminishes.
The traditional elegance of the positivist paradigm of international
law is derived from certain simplistic notions about "states" and
"individuals." As Bentham and many other positivists have put it,
international law is the law of the relations of sovereign states, while
municipal law is the law of the relations of individuals with sovereign
states or of individuals among themselves. 26 Like many simplicities,
the grand simplicity that international law is the law of sovereign-
state relations was never wholly true empirically, but it was nonetheless
extremely powerful as a concept defining and ordering the discipline. 27
What bodes likely to replace the grand simplicity of the positivist
theory of international law is the probably fatal challenge to the
practical and theoretical reality, not so much to the concept of the
"state" as to the sovereignty of the state. Accustomed as we are in the
United States to the division of sovereignty between the political
structures of the Federal Government and those of the individual
states, U.S. citizens are in an especially good position to appreciate
the trend toward legally divisible sovereign states elsewhere. Evidence
of the new sovereign state divisibility abounds: the tensions between
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the individual republics,
including Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Ukraine, and even Russia;
Canada and Quebec; Yugoslavia and Croatia, Serbia, etc. Furthermore,
24. Id. at xxix (emphasis added).
25. For an historic discussion of the critique of state-centric notions of international law
dating at least from Bentham's 1789 rationale for creating the very term "international law,"
see Mark Janis,Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of "International Law," 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 405
(1984) [hereinafter Janis, Bentham).
26. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION 296 (Burns & Hart eds. 1970).
27. Mark Janis, Individuals as Subjeas of International Law, 17 CoRN. INT'I L.J. 61, 63-64
(1984).
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new regional orders "above" traditional sovereign states are being
created that also dilute the sovereignty of existing states: the European
Communities;28 new regional trade zones, such as the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Zone; new regional human-rights structures, such as the
Council of Europe's Court and Commission of Human Rights.
29
Not only are heretofore sovereign states losing political and legal
authority to alternative governmental structures both "above" and
"below" them, but states are also losing chunks of real and theoretical
sovereignty to non-governmental forms of organization. The "individ-
ual" so crucial to the classic Benthamite definitions of international
and municipal law now includes not only natural persons, but also
"private parties" of the size and influence of I.B.M., Shell, and Toyota.
It is a commonplace that multinational corporations have more global
importance than do scores of small and poor sovereign states with seats
in the United Nations.
I am not arguing here either for or against the sovereign state, or
for or against its modern private challengers. I simply want to em-
phasize what seems to me the outstanding new fact of modern inter-
national politics: the grand simplicity of the sovereign state, on which
the positivist paradigm is grounded, is in serious decline and the
theory and reality of indivisible sovereignty will be weaker still in the
coming century.
The decline of the sovereign state and its replacement by a multitude
of structures and institutions that share in political and legal authority
is, I think, ushering in a new era. The old concepts of "municipal"
and "international" law are being supplanted by broader and more
flexible legal formulations. None of the new conceptions is entirely
replacing the old notions of municipal law or international law, one
for the state and its citizens internally and the other for the state
externally. Rather, the emerging concepts are helping constitute a new
theory of international legal pluralism, a theory that reflects the real
multiplicity of authoritative political structures.
In more and more circumstances, no one jurisdiction, no one au-
thoritative structure, including any state, has the sort of exclusive
legal authority that has traditionally been associated with sovereign
states and their legal institutions. Rather, what we conceive of as
legislative, executive and adjudicatory jurisdiction is increasingly di-
vided among a variety of legal structures or institutions. A search for
a decisive "law" needs to be transformed into a weighing or an inte-
gration of alternative "laws" which is more reflective of today's inter-
national reality.
28. John Bridge, American Analogues in the Law of the European Community, 11 ANGLO-Amo.
L. REV. 130 (1982).
29. MARK W. JANIs & RicHARD S. KAY, EuRoPEAN HumAN RIGHTS LAw 39-116 (1990).
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Take, for example, a possible human rights violation in England,
Instead of looking for the "law" that regulates the incident, it makes
sense to begin a legal analysis with what is more or less a conflict-of-
laws analysis of possible law and possible legal process. A country like
Great Britain has its own law and its own judicial and administrative
processes. Furthermore, regional law and process are available in the
form of European Human Rights Law and the European Commission
and Court of Human Rights. There may also be universal process and
law, in the shape of United Nations and customary law. While there
may well be answers as to priority of law and process, such answers
are neither assured nor necessarily the same from place to place or
from time to time. Ultimately, both realism and theoretical soundness
suggest that there are a variety of possible laws and legal processes
available to regulate any such matter. "Sovereignty" alone no longer
decides questions about the allocation of competence when competing
authority structures all have valid claims on the transaction.
Alongside the breakdown in the positivistic notions of "sovereignty"
and the state comes a necessary breakdown in international law's
conception of the "individual." In a sense, all the subjects of any law
are individuals. States, international organizations, business associa-
tions, religious communities, etc. are all finally composed of discrete
natural persons. A corporation, whether it be constituted for political,
military, economic, spiritual or whatever reasons, is always a legal
fiction, a lawyer's contribution to the dramatis personae of the world's
stage.
It is simply misleading and counterproductive for theory to distin-
guish between "states" on the one hand and "individuals" on the other.
If there is a sound distinction, it can only be between individuals and
corporate entities, states included. This should also put an end to the
positivist distinction between public and private law.30 It makes sense
to rethink all of the restrictions imposed upon individuals and private
corporate entities in international law. Why should suits in the Inter-
national Court of Justice be the sole prerogative of states? Why should
representation in the General Assembly and Security Council of the
United Nations be limited to unelected delegates of state govern-
ments? And why should an international trade court not be created in
which private corporations can sue state governments for violations of
international economic law?
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Such concrete challenges to traditional notions of international law
will likely make a considerable impact on the form and substance of
30. Cf. Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. (1988).
1991 / International Law?
our discipline. Clear and persuasive lines can no longer be drawn
between international law and municipal law. Rather, there are really
many boundaries that can be drawn between many different sorts of
law. For example, the dispute about whether the law of the European
Communities is "international" or "municipal" law is a sterile exercise
except as a way of illustrating how EC law is sometimes like traditional
public international law and sometimes like the law of a federal system
such as that of the United States. EC law is simply one of several
laws. So is the law of Connecticut. So is the law of Nigeria.
This does not mean, however, that drawing lines between legal
regimes ought to be the chief enterprise of the discipline of interna-
tional law. Much more important will be the resolution of conflicts
between competing rules and processes. This will be so whether such
rules and processes emanate from a constituent state like California, a
national state like Malta, a regional association like the EC, or a
universal structure like the United Nations. Equally important will
be the investigation, analysis, and reform of the rules and processes
themselves. In a way, the task of the discipline can be likened to the
fashioning of an immense jigsaw puzzle. Some will need to fashion
the pieces. Others will be called upon to fit the pieces together.
In light of the decline of the degree of sovereignty of the state and
the rise of alternative structures competing to regulate international
activity, the peculiarly parochial approach of international legal dis-
course in the United States is particularly outmoded. To insist on
emphasizing one legal system's approach to international law when
what is at stake are the relative merits of competing rules and pro-
cesses, is to approach the fundamental problem blindly. In the past,
U.S. legal scholars have made great contributions to the development
of international law. However, if American international lawyers focus
their scholarship and pedagogy on practice-oriented, United States-
focused conceptions of international law, they will miss a great op-
portunity to contribute to the transformation in progress.
Finally, I would like to ask whether the denomination of our
subject, "international law," still makes sense. Positivist international
law is rooted in the concept that relevant rules are those that address
the interests of competing sovereign states. However, non-state actors
now help to shape the global legal system. Arguably, it would be
more appropriate and useful to re-adopt the term "law of nations."
"Law of nations" was used in legal discourse until Bentham's criticism
of the term replaced it with "international law." Bentham felt that
"law of nations" did not clearly indicate that the subject had only to
do with relations among sovereign states. 31 Since "international law"
31. Janis, Bentham, supra note 25, at 408-09.
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does not now solely concern "sovereign states"-and indeed may never
have-it is time to put Bentham's term to rest. Now that the practical
and intellectual mold of international law is broken, why not announce
a new paradigm for the discipline using older terms, "law of nations"
or "droit des gens," which more readily signal the diversity and
complexities of the subject?
